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On the 1st April 1905, on the North Randfontein gold-mine in the Transvaal, a
simmering dispute between the Chinese Indentured labourers and the mine management
erupted in open violence. The whole of the Chinese work force on the mine
premises was involved and mounted European police were used to quell the outbreak.
As a result of this incident, described by the Conservative Colonial Secretary
as a dangerous dispute over wages, (1) fifty-three Chinese were arrested and
charged with public violence and assault with intent to do harm.(2) Following
these arrests the Chinese returned to work. On the 4th April, however, they
received a wage offer which formed not only the basis of the settlement at the
( North Randfontein, but was to serve as a model upon which the Transvaal Chamber
of Mines based its wage policy towards all Chinese, for the latter's remaining
period on the Rand.(3)
The importation of indentured Chinese labourers to work in the Witwatersrand Gold
Mines, which began in 1904, was a major part of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines'
response to an acute shortage of unskilled African labour. The shortage, the
severity of which was much disputed, was considered a general problem in the
Transvaal between 1903 and 1907 whose most serious repercussions were to be found
in the gold-mining industry.(4) After a heated campaign, both in South Africa
and Britain, the gold mine owners finally succeeded in winning the acceptance of
their demands for the importation of unskilled Asiatic labour in February of 1904.(5)
Following the signing of the Anglo-Chinese Labour Convention in May 1904, importation
began in earnest in July. The complement of the Chinese on the North Randfontein
consituted some of the earliest mining immigrants in the Transvaal, and developments
in connection with their work performance were clearly of considerable importance
as a result. The events at North Randfontein between 22nd March and 4th April
were given the urgent attention of the Chamber of Mines Labour Importation Agency
(CMLIA) largely because of this time factor: a 'satisfactory' solution at North
( Randfontein would not jeopardize wage policy in respect of the increasingly large
numbers of Chinese who passed out of their six months' probationary1 period
prescribed by the contract after April 1905.
This incident outlined above, sometimes misleadingly referred to as a strike,(6)
together with the events which surrounded it, are more than an important e-vent
in the development of the post-Anglo-Boer war gold-mining industry's wage policy.
They indicate, firstly, the considerable problem of source material in dealing with
certain aspects of the use of Chinese labour on the Transvaal gold-mines. Secondly,
events on the North Randfontein mine between August 1904 and April 1905 highlight
the manner in which economic and extra-economic control was utilized by the gold-
mining industry to ensure the profitability of low-grade ore mining on the
Witwatersrand. Thirdly, within the limits of the evidence, an understanding of
the nature of the Chinese miners' response to their environment, in a more
localized context than has been given in the past, (7) is made possible by an
examination of this sort.
The North Randfontein mine formed part of a block of twelve mines whose claims
derived from the sale of mining rights by the Randfontein Estates Gold Mining
Company on the West Rand.(8) Both the original prospecting and developing company,
and the twelve subsidiary Randfontein mines formed part of the larger Robinson
Group o^_ Companies. The directors and general manager of Randfontein Estates •
and North Randfontein, who were in effect the same people, were under the
personal chairmanship of J.B. Robinson himself. The North Randfontein mine in
1905 comprised 195 clavns on the farms of Uitval-fontein and Randfontein,
situated close to the township of Randfontein, (9) within the judicial d is t r ic t
of Krugersdorp.
The Randfontein section of the Main Reef, equal to 220 claims along the strike
of the Reef, was characterized by mines whose majority of pre-war work had not
proved highly payable. North Randfontein actually made a loss on i ts crushings ;.
of 9s.9d. per ton in 1898 and went out of production in 1899. The highest '
recorded pre-war prof i t on the Randfontein Section was that of South Randfontein>
which in 1898 returned a prof i t of 9s.9d. per ton. This bears unfavourable
comparison generally with other mines on the Main Reef in 1898/99 right along '
the outcrop as far east as the New CometMine, with the exception of the ,,
Langiaagte Staar-Paarl Central Section, an acknowledgly unsatisfactory part. '
These results were based on the yield from the reef known as the Randfontein
Leader, which, although r ich, was very th in, varying from a few inches to about
a foot in thickness. However, just prior to the war, prospecting operations : r
uncovered a new reef described as thenNumber 2"or"West Reef". This reef was proved^
and increasingly developed along the whole six-mile stretch of the Randfontein
properties. The high average assay value of the new reef gave a combined mil l ing
width at the Randfontein section of f ive and a half feet, and increased the
expected average prof i t from 5s. to 13s.4d. per ton.(10)
Against this enhancement of value, and easing of prof i tabi l i ty constraints
must be set several factors, some peculiar to the North Randfontein i tsel f
and some general to the mining operations of the Robinson group at Randfontein
which formed the general background to post-war mining on the West Rand. In the
f i r s t instance a small percentage of sorting was undertaken at the Randfontein
properties. This had the effect of lowering the grade of recovery, and
increased the inter-mix of waste on which the stamp batteries were working and
thus raised the working costs of the mines. I t was estimated that the grade on
the assays could have been raised by sorting from 41s. to 60s. per ton or more, .
with a similar gold value over the whole section, with increased prof i t .
Secondly, the Randfontein mines were hampered by the additional development cost
of extracting gold from the No. 2 Reef recently discovered over and above the
low prof i tabi l i ty returns of operations conducted on the Randfontein Leader.
Thirdly, the dip of the Reef at the outcrop at Randfontein was steep, and though
in depth i t averaged out at 35°, i t meant that Randfontein companies were l ikely
to be quickly drawn into the increased costs of deeper level mining. I t is clear,
in fact, that the North Randfontein experienced this problem reasonably quickly,
for, between 1899 and 1905, the company increased i ts claim areas south oj the
outcrop from 183 to 195.(11)
North Randfontein was not a large mine, either by the standards of the Robinson
group or the Witwatersrand as a whole. Nevertheless, after 1905 i t formed part
of that relatively select group of Witwatersrand mines which paid dividends to
i ts shareholders.(12) The North Randfontein's chief asset after the proving
of the West Reef was the consistency of i ts ore, the number of fine ounces won
therefrom and the size and value of i t s declared ore reserves. For example,
in 1906 the average grade of ore milled on the North Randfontein was 34.72
shillings per ton. This put the mine firmly in the third, or 30-40 shil l ing
category of average grade-ore estimates, which in 1906 produced 47.1% of al l
tons milled on the Witwatersrand in that year.(13) The ore reserves at December •
1905 were estimated at 375,074 tons, an assay value of 11.14 dwts per ton.(14)
In another important respect the North Randfontein indicated its moderate size.
The labour complement on the mine was about average size for the mines on the
Reef, both before the advent of the Chinese, and in the course of the experiment.
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In December T)04, the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association estimated the
total complement of the mine to be about 2,500 average for the whole year. In
December 1905, the complement annual average had declined, but was s t i l l about
; average size for the year - 2,128.(15) In December 1905, 35 mines were
I employing Chinese labour representing varying proportions of their total
complement; of these, seventeen were mines whose total complement was 2000
or over. More s ign i f icant , in the context of the events of the later part of| 1904 and early part of 1905, is the composition of the complement on the mine.
! Here there can be no doubt that the North Randfontein conformed to the pattern
of only a minority of the mines employing Chinese labour. In the WNLA report of
; 1905 complement detai ls of 32 out of the 35 mines employing Chinese are given,
i Of these 32, 18 retained an African labour complement of 10% or more whi ls t only
'. 11 retained an African labour complement of less than 10%. (16) Three returns
j on percentage of complement were not given. In 1906, complement detai ls of
29 mines employing Chinese were given, in which 15 retained an African labour
complement of more than 10%, 9 retained an African labour complement of less
I than 10%, and three returns on percentage of complement were not given.(17)
j Within the 0-10% range of 1905, only three mines had a lower percentage complement
! of African' labourers than the North Randfontein, whose 51 African labourers
' accounted for 2.4% of the tota l work complement on the mine.(18) Thus, out of
1
 Q. , a total average work complement of 2, 128 during 1905, the Chinese, as represent-
atives of the so-called unskilled category of workers on whom the main physical
burden of production demands f e l l , constituted the overwhelming proportion of
i the labour force on the mine. This work force composition is of crucial importance
•I in understanding the events between August 1904 and Apr i l 1905.
The 1,988 Chinese on the North Randfontein were a l l Northern Chinese from the
province of Ho-bei (or Chih- l i ) . (19) I t is also l i ke l y that the majority were
Or urban o r ig in , coming from the c i t y of Tien-ts in, and i t s neighbourhood, and
j that a signi f icant proportion of these men were also regular urban wage earners
I working within the established labour market structure of the c i ty . (20) They
; were a l l of good health, 74% of the complement haying natural immunity to small-
pox, and a high resistance to pneumonia.(21) I t is apparent that these men had not
only the physical attr ibutes necessary to conduct highly strenuous mining work,
: but had already acquired a level of discipl ined ac t i v i t y which made them
capable of sustaining high levels of productivi ty. The Superintendent of Foreign
•j Labour, W. Evans, formerly protector of Chinese in Perak, reported on the i r
..j arr ival in Durban that the 'men look well and strong . . . They were very orderly
l and respectful of their headmen,'(22)!
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In his reports on the condition of these men Evans omitted to mention, or was
probably unaware at the time, that their 'excellent organisation1 had already
been demonstrated in another capacity - that of mass act ion. During the prelim-
inaries of recruit ing and embarkation at Tientsin a serious dispute had broken
out between two groups of Chinese, one of which later formed the whole complement
on the North Randfontein mine.(23) The groups had been recruited by separate
agents working for the Chamber of Mines Labour Importation Agency, and had been
housed in separate parts of the c i t y . They came to blows over the death of one
prospective emigrant in a brawl. Another man died during the course of f ierce
hand-to-hand f ight ing. I t is quite clear from reports of the incident that
amongst both groups of men, the a b i l i t y to organise into larger groups capable
of conducting co-ordinated and pre-arranged manoevres was somewhat developed
even at this stage.(24) This feature which is of real importance in understanding
the Chinese response on the North Randfontein in March 1905, is hard to at t r ibute
to a particular source. Geographical homogeneity, indeed, what one might term
urban localism, was certainly a factor.(25) Important also was the considerable
delay between recruitment and embarkation, a period of six to seven weeks, in
which the common Ifloje of the recrui t ing depot aided the breakdown of barriers
to communication. Further, the existence of two r iva l groups in separate depots,
in which an element of competititon was present, and even encouraged i t seems,(26)
must have heightened the sense of common ident i ty and group interest.
Givenvthe normal recrui t ing and shipping policy of the CM.L.I .A. and these
particular circumstances, i t is both curious, and of some significance that one of
these groups should not have been broken up on their arr ival in South Africa
and allocated to, d i f ferent mines(27).
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The complement of Chinese who finally arrived at the North Randfontein mine,
1,988 men in all, and one child aged between 9 and 10 who accompanied his
father, a headman, (28) represented a diminution of 34 in the contracted
work force. 32 men had apparently deserted during the process of embarkation
which took four days to accomplish, between 29th June and 2nd July 1904.(29) ,
The group was further diminished by the death of a man from pneumonia [
contracted during the embarkation, and the disappearance of another.(30)
The men arrived on board the S.S. 'Swanley' at Durban on 1st August 1904,
after a journey which was notable for the quietness and health of the emigrants.
After spending a few days at the 'reception' depot at Jacobs, Port Natal,
the men travelled by rail, in groups of 400, direct to the North Randfontein mine,
arriving over a period of five days between the 6th and 10th of August 1904.
(31) It is clear that, from the first the majority of these men were employed
on work underground. In September 1904, for example, on average throughout
the month 1,965 Chinese were at work, of whom 1,366 were underground, but on
unspecified duties.(32) As the mine commenced crushing in November 1904, it
seems that the proportions of underground workers increased slightly, though
it is not clear in exact terms.(33) Of the total number of Chinese employed
on the mine it is difficult to estimate what proportion were headmen, although
reports suggest between 50 and 60 in March 1905.(34) This would have given an
average ^feSS^gang size of between 22 and 23 men between August 1904 and
April 1905. Underground and surface men both worked a 10-hour day, six days
a week, day or night shift, Sundays and specified holidays excluded, in
accordance with Article 9 of the contract. (35)
Apologists for the mining houses have been anxious to explain the great
numer of confrontations between the individual mine-managements and their
respective Chinese work forces, as the inevitable result of misunderstandings (36),
or by the application of blame to the Chinese as a racial type guilty of a particu-
lar type of moral weakness.(37) The enormous number of these disputes, their
manifold causes, and characteristics, make such simplistic judgements very
 :
suspect. Indeed, the degree of simple linguistic incomprehension tended to
decline over time. It is possible that its importance has been overestimated. (
The events at North Randfontein, an early incident taking place at the height ^
of Foreign Labour Department understaffing and deficiency in language skills,
suggest that this was of marginal importance. 'Misunderstandings' is an
inadequate term for expressing disputes which covered such a multiplicity
of circumstances, especially when it is clear that the directness of Chinese
action in many cases indicates that they at least were under no misconception
as to what their grievances were. Moral disapproval and racial explanations
likewise tend to conceal more than they reveal, especially as one may see
similar patterns of response in African mine labourers as in Chinese.(38)
Nor can it be effectively maintained that moral turpitude or a propensity
to resort to violence were the monopoly of the employed in many of these
cases. The real causes of these disputes will be better understood in the
context of the constraints of low-grade ore gold-mining, and more
particularly in the manner in which these constraints became articulated and
institutionalised, and the responses which these generated amongst the Chinese
work force on individual mines. The efficacy of revealing areas of
particularly actute tension amid the totality of relationships and problems
of the South African gold mining industry is clearly demonstrated by the
events at the North Randfontein mine. The locus of these tensions at North
Randfontein is not hard to find. In November 1904 the mine resumed crushing
C-
afterxan interval of over five years.(39) The increased production pressures
consequent upon this restarting are obvious, but it must also be appreciated
that these pressures were falling upon a work force unused to the intensity
and consistency of the rigours of producing gold mines. The Chinese had only
been on the min^ two and a half months at this stage. This situation must not,
however, be over-emphasised. The Southern Chinese on the New Comet Mine also
experienced a similar early baptism without showing any marked propensity
towards dissatisfaction, although they were men of distinctly inferior
physique, in many ways unsuited to their task.(40)
The natural discomfort of men relatively newly subject to long periods of
hard unhealthy labour was made more acute on the North Randfontein mine by
a decline in the size of the work force over a period of increasing productive
pressure. Further, this was a work force in which nearly the whole force of
these pressures fell directly, because of the small number of native labourers
employed at the mine. For example, the size of the work force declined ..
steadily from 1,979 in August to 1,899 in December of 1904, showing only a >
slight rise in January 1905 to 1,906.(41) Thereafter, it seems to have
remained fairly constant around this figure until a further decline occurred
in April 1905. This relatively small decline was more than offset for the
employers by an increase in the average number of working days per man per
calendar month, coupled with a decline in the average wage of the men. The
average number of working days per Chinese labourer per calendar month rose
from 16.54 in August (a short month) to 23.79 in January 1905, showing an
increase in every month except November. Over the same period the average •'.
wage for all Chinese in the mine rose from 1/0.77 pence per day of ten hours
in August to 1/6.89 pence per day in November. From then on wages declined
to 1/4.56 pence in December 1904, and rose slightly to 1/5.39 pence in .
January.(42) Thereafter, it appears that the rates remained fairly constant,
at a level below the l/6d daily average until April, when the day's pay system
was largely abandoned on the mine.(43) As far as the men were concerned then,
for some considerable time before the outbread of serious trouble on the mine,
they were asked to do more work, with fewer hands and for a declining or
static amount of money.
At North Randfontein, the intensity of exploitation was increased through
management ore-extraction policy. As has been mentioned already, the
assay value of the declared ore reserves of the North Randfontein in 1905 was
11.14 dwts to the ton.(44) However, at no point in 1904 or 1905 did the mine
process ore, or even tailings, appraoching that value. Concentrates were
the most consistently valuable, with a monthly yield Value of between 5.28
and 7.63 dwts to the ton, although their volume was very small.(45) Milling
was, of course, by far the largest constituent of the yields at any time.
Yet the highest declared assay value for milling in any one month between
November 1904 and August 1907, when the majority of the Chinese left the
mine, was 5.38 dwts per ton in November 1904.(46) This is hardly surprising.
The initially high figure is probably attributable to a desire to return
a high fine ounce yield in the first month of production when a small
number of tons of ore were hoisted. In general it is apparent that the
management adhered closely to the policy of not 'picking the eyes' of the
mine in order to push up its fine ounce yields throughout the time the
Chinese were working at North Randfontein. In terms of the work force
this had important consequences.
Increased fine ounce yields could only be won by working out higher grade
ore reserves more quickly, or by increasing the amounts of low grade ore
milled. In short, by increasing worker productivity. That the North
Randfontein chose the latter policy, or was forced into it by the necessity
of returning adequate dividends over a sufficiently lengthy period to make
November 1904
January 1905
May 1905
October 1905
January 1906
June 1906
September 1906
4,401
5,255
5,542
6,126
6,230
6,000
6,138
up for the eight yearn of productive operations without dividends, is clear
from the crushing returns of the mine. One feature of these is the contrast
between the consistency of the assay values and the constantly upward trend of
gold-ore tonnage mil led i n 1905: in November 1904 10,350 tons of ore were
actually mi l led; in January 1905, 14,700 tons; in May, 15,246; in October
15,322 tons. Thereafter, something of a plateau is reached. This is best
Indicated in the f ine ounce yields from mi l l ing which were as follows :
date to ta l y ie ld ( f ine ozs.) y ield from mi l l ing ( f . ozs)
2,785
2,949
3,073
3,314
3,647
3,581
3,476
In 1905 the mine yielded 68,407 fine ounces of gold from all sources; in
1906 73,101 fine ounces from all sources.(47) Thus,the greatest pressure
from rising output was coincidental with the decline in the Chinese work
strength and poor wage position in the period November 1904 to April 1905.
An additional management policy also contributed to turning this potential
source of discontent into an actual grievance and dispute by two decisions
on wage policy. In the first place, as part of a general wage strategy, the
Chamber of Mines Labour Importation Assocation, of which the North Randfontein
was a member, initiated a drive to hold up productivity under the day's pay
scheme of the Chine labourers' contract. This was made politically acceptable
by characterising it as an attack on loafing or as a request for a fair day's
work for a liberal day's pay.(48) On the North Randfontein this appeared
to take two forms, of incentive and penalty. As an incentive scheme for the
tactically important hammer-men, it was decided to pay a bonus over and above
the basic rate of one. shilling per day of ten hours (the standard pay for the
first six months of duration of the Chinese labourers' contract) for hammer work
over twenty-four inches, with an additional bonus on the completion of three
feet. Regardless of the amount drilled, between nine and twenty-four inches,
the one shilling basic rate applied. As a penalty, it was decided to reduce by
half a penny the basic rate of one shilling, for every hole drilled which was
under nine inches.(49) From the evidence it is not exactly clear when this
scheme came into operation at the North Randfontein. It seems that it was
probably introduced, as on other mines, piecemeal: the first part to be
initiated being the incentive scheme, whilst the more contentious penalty
clauses were introduced somewhat later. It is likely that the incentives for
hammer-work came in with the commencement of crushing in November 1904/ The
sharp downward turn in wages indicated earlier, followed by a slow rise"and
levelling out is possibly indicative of a change in work patterns followed
by gradually increasing ability and productivity, under incentives. Penalties
came later, most likely towards the end of Febnuary 1905. Quite why they would
have come in then is problematical. It might have been the management's
response to a temporary decline in the tonnage milled, which was occasioned
by February being a short month, and one in which the Chinese New Year fell
in 1905. The latter meant the loss of three full days, or six shifts.(50)
There are indications that loafing was on the increase also, as the pattern
of dissent amongst Chinese was changed from that of large scale desertion.(51)
It might also have been the direct result of the agreement between the
Foreign Labour Department and the Chamber of Mines, the C.M.L.I.A., and the
Committee of General Managers and Consulting Engineers to allow individual
mine*, to mulct 'shirkers1 of their wages. This was finalised on March 3rd
1905, although it did not become offical policy until after the dispute
at the North Randfontein.(52) In any case it was certainly in operation by
March 7th 1905.J53) Although the stipulations of Clause 6 of the contract of
service probably allowed for incentive-type additions to the basic day
scheme, the penalty-type deductions were a far cry from the protective
intent of this minimum wage clause.(54)
Secondly, the North Randontein mine management also allowed itself to go
into breach of contract with all the Chinese" workers at the mine in respect
of Clause 6 of the contract. The minimum wage clause of the contract did not
stop at the provision for the day rate for the first six months of work under
the three year agreement. It also provided that in the event of the average
wage of a particular gang of Chinese workers being below fifty shillings
per month, then the basic rate of pay to be given to each man must thenceforth
be a minimum of one shilling and sixpence per day. It is clear from the response
of the mine management to the Chinese petititon of the 22nd March 1905, that the
basic day rate had not at that time been raised to one shilling and sixpence -
(_• that is over seven calendar months after the arrival of the last Chinese on
the North Randfontein.(55) The fact of breach of contract still applies
even if the basis of thirty working days is taken as the basis of monthly
calculations. The importance of this becomes clear when even the Transvaal
Government was forced to admit that the average rate for the Chinese on the
North Randfontein appeared to be under the stipulated minimum of fifty shillings
per month.(56)
It is apparent from the timing of events at North Randfontein that it was this
breach of contract by the mining management which set in motion the events which
ended with the arrest of fifty-three so called ringleaders on April 1st. Up
until this point Chinese discontent with their working conditions had taken
the more usual forms of desertion and simple unwillingness to give of their
best - 'loafing1 in mining house terms. (Genuine cases of poor performance
should also not be discounted, especially as this was still a relatively
early stage of the Chinese term of employment). Desertion from the North
Randfontein mine had become so bad by January 1905 that the Foreign Labour
Department requested and obtained the restriction of all Chinese to the North
Randfontein's mining premises (as opposed to the premises of the licence
(; holders, Randfontein Estates, which would have included the eleven other
Randfontein mines).(57) Combination as a means of defence had also been tried
as early as August 30th 1904, but the severity of the management's response
possibly proved a deterrent to immediate repetition of this type of action.(58)
In this context, therefore, it is clear that the decision of the Chinese to
resort to combination for a second time is indicative of a fairly acute level
of tension between management and labour over the whole range of production
and wage problems.(59) The absence of any statement in either direction makes
it impossible to be certain whether the decision of the Chinese to combine
without striking was in any way effected by their initial experience of the
management's sharp way with dissent. The high degree of tactical skill
displayed by the Chinese throughout the dispute suggests that it was a poss-
ibility. In any case, this second Chinese combination at Randfontein took
the form, initially, of a mass petition in response to the breach of contract
position adopted by the mining management. On the 22nd March 1905, one
hundred and forty days after their arrival, the Chinese petitioned that all
\ members of their gang should receive a minimum monthly wage of fifty shillings
8in accordance with Cl, use 6 of the contract.(60) In answer to the
peti t ion, the Manager explained, correctly, that the clause stipulated
that the average wage of the gang should be f i f t y shillings per month,
not that f i f ty , s y i l i gs be the basic rate for each individual Chinese.
As to the question of the one shil l ing and sixpence day rate, he said
that he could not inform them at that moment as the mine management was
in communication with the government, but he hoped to be able to give an
answer in two weeks. I t is apparent that the manager, through his
interpreter, had considerable d i f f icu l ty in getting the Chinese to under-
stand the difference between 'average1 and ' individual' pay. Nevertheless,
the Chinese eventually seemed to accept the explanation and for the next
six days work on the mine went on as usual pending settlement of the claim.
On March 28th 1905 the mine manager countered the Chinese petition with an
offer of his own. He offered the headmen the following:
' In addition to the one shi l l ing per ten hour shif t , the boss
boys should receive the sum of one penny for each hole of twenty
four inches or over dr i l led by any member of their gang, plus a
bonus of sixpence per shif t i f a l l coolies in their gang dri l led
thi r ty six inches or over.1 (61)
No mention is made in the Superintendent of Foreign Labour's report, of
any offer being made at this stage to the members of each hammer-gang.
Indeed, in view of the management's offer of 4th April which specifically
applied bonuses to al l members of the gang on a more equitable basis, i t
seems that no particular offer was made to members of hammer-gangs or other
Chinese on the 28th March except to raise the rate for day work from one shi l l ing
to one shi l l ing and sixpence in contradiction of the management's earlier
position.(62) The Superintendent declared this offer to the headmen to
be "most reasonable", as, indeed financially speaking, i t was. As a considerable
number of Chinese on hammer work were d r i l l i ng two feetor more (63), despite
claims by the CM.L.I.A. of widespread loafing, they stood to make a large
amount of money out of the arrangement. As far as the management was
concerned i t was not only a reasonable of fer, insofar as i t did not open up
any prospect of large scale increases in wages, i t was also an extremely
ingenious one, for i f i t had been accepted, i t promised to settle a troublesome
wage claim at the same time as i t gave important and influential members of the
Chinese work force a vested interest in rooting out loafing without the need
to resort to the rather cumbersome procedure elaborated by the Foreign Labour
Department and the Chamber, earlier in the month. I t was just this aspect of the
whole settlement which made the offer unacceptable for headmen and hammermen
alike. For the former, i t would have put them into a position analoguoi^ s to
that of the hated compound police. For men whose moral and material position
depended to a large degree on the extent to which they were integrated into the
general working experience of the Chinese miners, this was obviously an
impossible offer. For efficient and ineff ic ient hammer-men, the offer was
likewise unacceptable. For those who were productive within the C.M.L.I.A.'s
meaning of the term, i t was unremunerative and insulting. For the inefficient
ones, although i t held out the prospect of increased money for l i t t l e work,
i t threatened to add a second, and potentially more effective weapon to the
attack which had already been mounted against them by the CM.L.I.A. Indeed,
i t may be fa i r ly stated that the offer was more calculated to unite the group
against the management, rather than divide them which appears to be the
intention. The headmen had l i t t l e choice but to refuse the offer, and did so
in a manner calculated to demonstrate their solidarity with their fellow
workers, whilst keeping within the bounds of legality: by resigning their
positions as headmen en masse and requesting to revert to the positions of
hammermen. (64) In so doing they avoided laying themselves open to a charge
of refusal to work. The management refused to accept their resignations.(65)
This vas the crisis of the dispute. By resigning, the Chinese headmen had
indi&ed their rejection of the management's offer. This was a defensive
gesture in that It was not coupled with a new claim or even a reiteration of
the petition of-,22nd March. It was also an offensive of a kind in that it
removed the whole basis of the management's offer of the 28th March. This
meant that as far as the management were concerned, they either had to make
a completely new offer and accept the superior bargaining position of the
' Chinese, or they had to force the acceptance of the original scheme. In
view of the very tight control over the wages bill which a day scheme with
limited application of bonuses of this kind offered, especially if the
penalty scheme of the C.M.L.I.A. and the control functions of the headmen .•'•}
were fully utilised, and 1n the general absence of piece work amongst Chinese
gangs at this moment (66), it is hardly surprising that the management opted
for the forced acceptance of their scheme. That the Chinese were aware that
the refusal of their resignations meant the management's refusal to make
a new type of offer 1s clear from their subseqent action.
To understand the Import of events that followed 1t is necessary to emphasize
(/ that the management, from the date of their offer, were operating from a very
powerful position. Their offer on basic rates had effectively removed them from
their position of breach of contract. They were quite within their rights in
making the offer to the headmen alone. They were quite within their rights
also 1n refusing to accept the resignations: the management under the contract
could rquire a man to remain in a position assigned to him.(67) The legal
position of the Chinese headmen on the other hand was a very tenuous one. They
could not simply refuse the offer without running a very real risk of being
arrested for refusal to work. This was no unlikely thread: the management
had already successfully prosecuted fifty headmen for disobedience to orders
in August 1904. Thus, management power and intransigence, if it was to be
resisted at all, had to be resisted with a high degree of defensive skill, used
within extremely tight limits. It is the complete success of the Chinese in
this respect which gives the North Randfontein dispute its peculiar flavour(68).
It also demonstrates clearly, despite the almost overwhelming hostility of
the evidence, that this particular group of men had a very real awareness of their
bargaining position, which they were prepared to use.
The question then arises: why were the Chinese prepared to embark upon such
(• a path which seemed to hold out so little prospect of success? The answer must
be that the deliberateness with which the management went Into breach of
contract and then made an offer which threatened to destroy the only source
of real strength, their solidarity, crystalised and made explicit all the
mounting discontents with working conditions which had been accumulating over
the past seven months. That these discontents were the result of constraints
imposed by the necessities of profitable exploitation of the low grade x>re
reserves of the Witwatersrand, heightens rather than diminishes the importance
of this whole incident at the same time that It demolishes the crude thesis
of simple misunderstanding which was such a favoured excuse of the mining
houses.(69)
Thus the second stage of dispute was an intensification of the characteristics
of the first part, and followed logically from the position of the Chinese that
they had no choice between total acquiescence to a wage system which they
hated and which would be Introduced by default, and continued resistence. The
headmen simply accepted their enforced retention of their positions and turned
it to their own account. Contemporaries referred to the consequences of the
Chinese action as a strike. Today we should refer to it as a work-to-rule.
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From the night sh i f t of 29th March, unti l mid-way through the day shif t of
 ;
April 1st, no Chinese hammer men dr i l led more than thirteen inches of rock
or dri t led less than twelve inches.(70) I t seems that the sol idarity of
the hammer men was total and at times enforced violently by Chinese on thei r
few fellow dissidents.(71) Naturally, the dispute affected other men on the
mine as fai lure to realise advance material to fac i l i ta te crushing brought
the mine to a standst i l l . (72) I t is evident that 1n this situation the :*
headmen wielded great power over their fellow workers. This, i t w i l l be . •
recalled had been a feature of this particular group even at the time of
their arrival in South Africa. In circumstances which had so markedly increased
their moral authrji ity, this characteristic became accentuated. This flow of ,
power downwards amongst the Chinese, reinforced by the management's unwitting
support of the headmen's position, throws doubt upon the Superintendent of ,.q . '
Foreign Labour's suggestion that the y
'old gamblers and opium smokers, who are too debilitated to do more y^
than twelve inches, and who cannot earn sufficient by means of their ^
work to enable them to compete when gambling against coolies earning . .,
large sums at the end of the month, have frightened the 'boss' boys
into demanding this minimum wage of f i f t y shil l ings.1 (73) ,.•"•
v
Wolfe Murray, the Superintendent, asserted himself that the headmen had their
comrades 'ent irely in their power'.(74) Furthermore, given the premium
placed on productive capacity, i t is unlikely that such debilitated men would
have been retained as rock dr i l lers in any proportions l ikely to be effective
or signif icant. Indeed i t seems that poor performance on the stope face was „
more l ikely to come from capable men unwilling to apply themselves - i .e. :•.
loafers. No one plausibly suggested that i t was these men who had the ab i l i t y
to frighten the headmen into making minimum wage demands.(75) The popularity
of the eventual settlement, based on the wide application of piece work rates
which were inimical to debilitated men and loafers alike, suggests that the
real driving force behind the dispute was simple dissatisfaction with
management wage and production policy, and not unprincipled demands for a .:
minimum wage without any corresponding effort from one section of the Chinese
work force. This is also consistent with the defensive character of the -\
Chinese resort to direct action which followed not as a direct result of the >
management's offer of 28th March, which was in effect a rejection of the :;
petit ion of 22nd, but as a consequence of the management's rejection of the
headmen's request to resign. ; r
There is no indication that direct action in the dispute involved, at this >c
stage, any more than the hammer gangs. This is not suprising in that the •::'
wage offer which was being protested against was aimed at these men, who were.1
in any case the great majority of the men on the mine. Furthermore, the - ' -••
dependence of surface men on the productivity of the men on the stope fa*ce,
meant that for tactical purposes, in the successful prosecution of a worik to :
rule, i t was not an important area of active support. That these men gave >'
taci t support is evident from the fact that only one man out of nineteen
hundred turned evidence against the headmen, and even then not unt i l the
second day of the work-to-rule.
The high degree of tactical sophistication impl ic i t in a work-to-rule of \:
this kind has been emphasized. This was operative at two separate levels.
In the f i r s t instance i t was of sufficient power to effect the production
on the mine. In the second instance, in that i t was peaceful and at no point
represented a breach of contract by the Chinese, i t was suff iciently formidable
a weapon to force the management to negotiate, in i tself a significant
concession. As Wolfe Murray ponted out "there is no provision either
in the Labour Importation Ordinance or in the laws of the Transvaal, for
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for punishing tiem." (76) That this was no mere chance, and that the Chinese on the
North Ra>»dfontein and other mines had a clear knowledge of their rights and
powers of which they were prepared to make use, was admitted by Lt. Governor
Lawley when he stated that considerable difficulty was caused by Clause 6 (the
wages clause) "whieh is clearly understood by every Chinaman and which is a very
powerful weapon in their hands..."(77) This was also an implicit admission in
the response of both the mine management and the CM.L.I.A. to the situation at
the North Randfontein.
The details of the management's activity on the 30th March are not clear, except .' ;
in that they endeavoured to negotiate a return to normal working by the Chinese, '\~.
apparently without success.(78) On 31st March the Mine Manager called in the ",'.„!".."]
General Manager of the C.N.L.I.A., Baqotand its Chinese adviser, Baldwin, who .,!.t
had accompanied these Chinese from Taku on the S.S. "Swanley",(79) to help with .re-
negotiations (80). These continued throughout the day, and despite the management's,,
success in getting one man to turn evidence against the headmen, they failed to
 <t;,
reach a settlement with the Chinese which would restore production on the mine. ^ ?
It was, therefore, decided by the C.N.L.I.A. and the mine management jointly, ,.'•'
to take the offensive even though this involved measures of doubtful legality. .\^'.u
C- Firstly, they decided not to credit the tickets of any of the hammer men because, V
the management maintained, none of them had drilled more than twelve inches.(81)
Secondly, it was decided to take advantage of the information supplied by the coll-
aborator and arrest the ringleaders for "refusal to work". As these charges
were easily open to challenge 1n court, as all prosecuting parties to the dispute
tacitly admitted by not laying them subsequently, this action must be interpreted , .
as one of provocation on the part of the management. There can be little doubt
that the calling in of mounted European police to effect an arrest for which there
was no legal case, was unlikely to pass off without serious disruption. The
manager of the mine admitted this himself to the Sergeant-in-Charge at Randfontein
on the 31st, when he requested police to effect the arrests as "trouble was . ..,
anticipated" at the mine.(82). ,
 :
At this point it must be made clear that there are grounds for believing that
the CM.L.I.A. was guilty of duplicity. In his report to the Lt. Governor of
the Transvaal, Wolfe Murray claimed that he did not intervene on behalf of the
Government in the dispute at this stage because of assurances from Bagot, the
General Manager, that "there was no danger of a riot and that the police had
simply to be called in to arrest the ringleaders who had been discovered." (83)
(^  Although this does not exonerate the Superintendent from the charge of almost
incredible naivity, especially as he had been aware of the trouble at North
Randfontein for at least thirty-six hours previous to his interview with Bagot,
it does explain why no officer from the Foreign Labour Department appeared on
the mine premises until after the serious riot of 1st April. Bagot's assurances
were simply directly at variance with the message given by Bulman, the mVie
manager, to the Randfontein police. Yet in the final analysis this is a detail.
Wjat was really at stake at this point in the dispute, was the ability of the
mine-managements to call in sufficient state power to coerce the Chinese into
accepting a wage settlement that was favourable to the mining-houses. Wolfe
Murray and his small team of Inspector and Interpreter were of little use 1n
this case, despite the fact that the Foreign Labour Department concurred at every .
point with C.H.L.I.A. policy. The troopers of the Randfontein and Krugersdorp
Constabulary promised to settle the matter much more effectively. As Bagot
himself said when requesting Wolfe Murray not to intervene: ,
•the principle involved (of extracting a fair day's work for a fair
day's pay) was of such vital importance to the mining industry that
he considered it advisable to try and allow the employers to show the
coolies that they had power enough to settle the natter for themselves,
without the intervention of the Government.1 (84)
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At first everything went according to the plans of the CM.L.I.A. and the , .
management,. Thirty-six of the fifty-three earmarked headmen were in the
compound on the morning of 1st April. Their arrest was effected by half of the ..»-,,
police force of twenty-two without difficulty, around 10.00 a.m. A lull of
about two and a half^hours followed, pending the arrival of the other shift
from below ground. Throughout this time all the police remained inside the
compound amid the thirteen hundred or so Chinese without incident.(85) At
about 12.30 p.m. the working shift was called up. On their arrival at the •<•<•;•
shaft head, they "scented danger" and instead of returning to the compound,
they took up a position on the South Dump of the mine, some eighty feet up. s,
Bui man failed, once again, to persuade these men, numbering over six hundred, •-,,
to come down and allow the ringleaders to be arrested. (86) During these :--<^n
conversations contact was established between the group in the compound and ••.."-ad
the group on the dump. This seems to have prompted the police to remove what *, -_.{.*
prisoners they had, outside of the compound gates.(87) As this was being .^ v
done, all the Chinese in the compn«nHattacked the police with sticks, - ,i2
: stones, bottles and drills, and attempted to cut off their means of escape. .(.-t$-*
The police managed to extricate themselves but at the cost of their prisoners. ^
They also failed to keep the Chinese inside the compound, because of the .,- ...
enormous barrage of missiles which rained down on them. "The police then took •- , ;
up a position at the corner of the compound to prevent the party on the South ,-
shaft joining those on the compound, who were at this time climbing a big stone ; ..
dump about eighty feet high close to the compound gates. Several charges were .;.
made at both parties to prevent them joining, but without success. The >
i determination shown by the coolies at this stage of the fight being too great
! for the police, the troop withdrew and allowed the seven hundred coolies on the -.,
i South shaft to join those on the dump near the compound." (88) The Chinese ,
'I-' remained on the dump for about two hours, giving the police time to communicate
with Flordia for more men. In the early afternoon they descended the dump and
made off in a large mass for the Lancaster mine, presumably with the intention of
enlisting the help o* the s~ve* hundred Chinese employed there. The police allowed
them sufficient time to get away from the Randfontein group of mines, and then
gave chase by way of the railway line in the direction of Krugersdorp. They met
up with the line of Chinese near the Horsham-Monitor mine. They were joined
there by police reinforcements from Krugersdorp. "With repeated charges"
through the line of Chinese they were able to turn them homeward and eventually
disarm them. With the arrival of more police from Florida, Roodepoort, and .-i
Luipardsvlei, the arrest of the fifty-three 'ringleaders' was effected. The
remainder of the Chinese were marched back to Randfontein, whilst the captives
were set to Krugersdorp to be charged.(89) On Monday 3rd April the mine was •_••,.
reported to be working normally. (90) and the fifty-three headmen had been
charged (91), with public violence and assault with intent to do harm, for which
they received three months hard labour on the first count, and six months on the
second. Even Wolfe Murray had the grace to admit that it was ^ e
'by the merest chance that the offenders took part in the riot,
which might never had occurred and inithey might have refrained
from taking part.1 (92) u^fluvL. .
There can be no doubting that the action of the management and the C.M.L.I.A. :,
in bringing in the police precipitated an explosive demonstration of total
solidarity amongst the Chinese, which also reiterated the consistently defensive
nature of the action of these men. It also gave further indication, if one was •'
needed of the degree of support enjoyed by the headmen in their opposition to the
management's offer of 28th March. The Commissioner of Police in Johannesburg
;
 described the incident as the "most serious disturbance we have had", (93) despite
the fact that no loss of life was recorded. This was the seventeenth
disturbance amongst the Chinese since their arrival, which had necessitated the
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calling in of the European police. (94) The Inspector-in-charge at
Krugersdorp admitted to being areatly surprised by the determination of the
Chinese as well as by their tactical skill:
'Each time we, charged them they waited for us and threw their
missiles when we were almost on to them. All the horses and men
were hit several times.1 (95)
Indeed, the fighting on April 1st confirmed and emphasized all the character-
istics of the Chinese mine workers on the North Randfontein which had been
observable over the past months: their capacity for disciplined mass action, r •• j.
their tactical appreciation, and their determination to resist some of the ,. oi-
worst excesses of the management's exploitative techniques. ' r";
What were the consequences of this affair? In respect of the North Randfontein
mine in particular, it secured the rejection of the offer of 28th March and its *:-,.
substitution by a much more equitable bonus system. For on the 4th April the -.- x
management made a new offer to the Chinese hammer men as follows : •*: •
'All coolies on piece work or desiring piece work to be offered the -••;••••
opportunity of accepting a supplementary agreement in terms of
Clause 6 of the contract of service, at the following rates: Jd,
per inch drilled, with a bonus of threepence per shift if 36 inches
or over were drilled.' (96)
On 14th April the agreement was settled in its final form:
'Jd. per inch up to 36 inches, with bonuses of threepence for 36 ^
inches to 47 inches; fivepence for 48 inches to 59 inches and •;--:•;,
so on up to nine pence maximum.1 (97) :•:
Thus for the temporary loss of approximately sixty headmen the Chinese had
secured considerable improvements. Those on piece work had secured the removal .
of the penalty limit, had secured a more favourable bonus system, and had it
extended to all concerned with hammer work. This in addition to the instigation ':•
of the one and sixpence day rate for all others, which had been in operation at :
North Randfontein since 28th March. Selborne believed that this was a
significant improvement in the position of the Chinese and recommended its
extension to all Chinese working in situations to which piece work was
applicable. (98)
More generally, after the North Randfontein dispute and as a consequence of it, ,.!
piece work contracts were rapidly extended wherever possible. Furthermore, ••;
offers of the type made on the 28th March at the North Randfontein were pever
repeated on any mine. In fact bonuses to headmen became subject to considerable •
scrutiny by the Transvaal and British governments for fear of an embarassing
repetition of a North Randfontein-type situation.(99) This was undoubtedly
a great gain for the Chinese. Why was the Chamber of Mines prepared to go along
with, and introduce so quickly, a new type of wage system for the Chinese
working after the expiry of their first six months of contract?
In one sense the North Randfontein dispute only highlighted problems, and did
not provide answers for the Chamber. It indicated clear that incentive and
control mechanisms could not be transmitted safely through the Chinese themselves.
Piece work became a necessity if the twin needs of rising production and
consistency were to be implemented without provoking a similar kind of
disturbance again. North Randfontein then, symbolised the inauguration of a
more sophisticated and externalised system of labour management which also had
the appearance of considerable gains for the Chinese who worked under it.
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Obviously in its initial phases the new arrangements were not without their
'defects', and the Chamber was forced to move rapidly in its attempts to plug
these loopholes and tighten control.
This process was paralleled by another. The North Randfontein had not effectively *
answered the problenrof how to eradicate loafing under day's pay rates. The
particular group of Chinese under consideration at the North Randfontein were
at the end of their initial period of six months and so the problems which
faced the management thereafter were somewhat different. Yet many Chinese on
other mines had varying parts of their initial six months still to run, or
were under day rates under jobs listed in Schedule 2 of the contract of service.(100)
North Randfontein, moreover, was a dispute in which loafing and associated problems
had played a large part. Thus the events of March 22nd - April 4th added greater,
urgency to attempts to find a definitive solution to the control mechanisms ro-
under day rates.
The extension and refinement of piece work contracts and the search for a solution
to the day-rates problem advanced together. Briefly, what were the main features .:
of this process? .. ••?
In the first place it is clear that the absnece of penalty stipulations in
supplementary piece work contracts, was no indication of their removal. In truth"
the reverse was the case. They became intensified as Selborne admitted when he
stated it was universal practice on the mines to pay nothing at all for rock
drilled of less than twenty-four inches in length.(101) At the same time he stated
that men who had been on surface work at rates of less than one shilling and
sixpence under Schedule 2 of the contract, would, in view of the rise in day rates
which would necessarily accompany the introduction of piece work, be substituted
by African labour to whom the minimum wage stipulation of Clause 6 did not apply.
Wherever possible the substituted men would be put on piece work contracts. (102)
Furthermore, it appears that the penalty system under day rates was systematically
extended after the North Randfontein dispute, and on a suitable equivalence
scale, applied to other classes of work than rock drilling.(103) This penalty
system was further refined by the stipulation that a man who had agreed to do
piece work should not be able to claim the basic day rate if he failed to measure
up to the stipulated minimum.(104) The mining houses were also officially :
exonerated from the burden of furnishing particulars of the average pay of
Chinese labourers employed for any particular month after the expiration of the six
months of service.(105) This was very helpful in concealing embarrassing
information about averages which otherwise might come out as a result of the •-. (
wholesale application of these penalties. The cornerstone was put on this impressive
edifice of extractive powers by the simultaneous admission by the Attorney-General's
department that there was "no oblication on the employers to maintain the average
pay referred to in paragraph three of Clause six after the expiration of six
months" (106). The Government only stopped short of allowing the Chamber ^ f Mines
to calculate these averages in a manner which would have excluded the great*
majority of newly recruited Chinese, on the basis that they were inefficient,
because of the political impossibility of tampering with the contract.(107) In
the event, the economic and extra-economic controls which became built into the
piece work system made the resort to barring automatic wage rises by illegal
means unnecessary. There is no reason to expect that the men on the North
Randfontein escaped any of the refinements of the penalty system, as they were
extended to all mines employing Chinese on piece work. (108)
As a system designed to increase the productivity of the labourer without a
substantial increase in the relative overall wages bill, it was a great success.
Between 31st December 1904 and December 31st 1905 the accounts of the North
Randfontein, for example, showed a decline in the debit balance on the profit and
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loss account from £102,375 to £1,172, the latter figure including allowance
for a dividend payment of £45,000, although a sum of £82,385 development and war
expenditure* formerly debited to profit and loss account was transferred to the
debit of share premium account (which showed a credit balance of £92,426 in
December 1905, as opposed to a credit balance of £174,812 in December 1904). (109)
Furthermore the yields of fine ounces of gold rose in every month after April 1905
at North Randfontein until Decmber, with the exception of November, when there was
a decline of 151 fine ounces on the October figure.(110) More significantly,
perhaps, the monthly totals of gold won from milling also rose ewery month between
April and December, with exception of June, when there was a decline of 60 fine
ounces on the May figure.(Ill) No further major disturbances resulting from
wage disputes were reported from Randfontein between 1905 and 1907. '
The degree of economic control secured by the piece work contract was matched by
a similar extension of the extra-economic control over the Chinese. Under the
Clause 6 of the original contract it had been clearly stated that piece work should >''
only be undertaken after mutual agreement between employer and employee. However, •
an examination of the supplementary agreements in force on all parts of the Rand, v
makes it quite clear that with the signing of these agreements this area of
bargaining power was removed from the Chinese: thenceforward employees were to
/ **o hand drilling at piece work rates "whenever required by the employer". (112)
oiven the increased penalties under piece rates, this was a considerable gain for
the mining houses and one which took some explaining away. Lyttleton showed concern '
lest he be politically embarrassed, but let himself be fobbed off with vague
assurances from Selborne, on the basis of information supplied by the mining
interest. The truth of the matter seems to be that such developments coincided
with tht increasingly dominant control functions of the Government exercised through
the Foreign Labour Department.(113) Jamieson, the new Superintendent of Foreign
Labour, outlined this programme quite clearly in August of 1905 when he stated
'that it is my duty to do everything I possibly can to co-operate
harmoniously with the Chamber of Mines with a view to making their
experiment a complete success1.
The measures which he envisaged, which would induce the spirit of harmonious
co-operation, were the retention of the right to flog the Chinese, the imposition
of collective powers of fining, increasing the Government's powers of repatriation,
and resting increased legal powers in this particular area of executive power.(114)
( "n the extension of this formidable apparatus of control, there was an economic
ddvantage which stemmed from the peculiar conditions under which indentured labour
was imported into South Africa. The Chamber of Mines Labour Importation Association
had been set up by the Chamber of Mines to control recruiting in China and oversee
the distribution of labourers, in a manner similar to that of the Witwatersrand
Native Labour Association SF Africa.(115) In this respect, apart from introducing
significant economies of scale into importation procedures and maintaining a -
balance of supply of indentured labourers amongst the various mining groups, the
CM.L.I.A. prevented competititon amongstthe mines from driving up the rates
offered to recruits in an attempt to increase the labour supply. This situation
was obtained by the use of a standard contract, with previously determined wage
rates, which was issued to prospective labourers only at the emigration depots,
and only after the CM.L.I.A. had secured power of attorney from the group of
mines importing the labourers.(116) This control of wage rates at source could
not be extended, however, beyond the first six months of the contract unless day
rates remained in force throughout the length of all Chinese labourers contracts.
Yet, as we have seen, the major consequence of the North Randfontein dispute was to
encourage the CM.L.I.A. in an offensive against all forms of "inefficiency",
by the widespread introduction of piece work contracts after April 1905. It was,
moreover, just this kind of wage payment which was not amenable to control and
prohibition of inter-group competition. What was it that encouraged the Chamber
Mi )
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to abandon the tight control over wage rates without the protection of a maximum
average clause? (117)
The answer must be sought in the protective clauses of the Anglo-Chinese Labour
Convention of May 1904,(118) and clause 2 of the contract of service. Article
Xlll of the Convention, and the implementing of clause 2 of the contract provided
that transference of labourers between one employer and another was only to be
undertaken with the consent of labourer, the Chinese consul, the Superintendent
of Foreign Labour, and the employers concerned. However, as the editors of the •
North China Herald were quick to point out, the contract was conspicuous more .
for what 1t did not say than what it laid down. (119) Clause 2 and Article XIII
were the only mention of the labourer's right of mobility, once in South Africa; ..
that is of mobility in respect of occupational location. The alternative was
self-financed repatriation. However, this stipulation in no way altered the :
bargaining power of the indentured labourers in South Africa •given the prohibitive
cost of such a venture. (The Liberal Government's repatriation scheme merely
substituted the prohibition of costs for that of administrative arbitrariness).
Moreover, Clause 2 assumed that the initiative for mobility would come from an
employer, not an employee, and simply required mutual consent. It gave no
generalised right of mobility to the Chinese labourers. In the situation of
labour shortage in which the Chinese were introduced into South Africa it was also
unlikely that employers would collude to their own disadvantage by encouraging
labourer mobility amongst the groups. Thus unless the employer chose, for reasons
other than simple repatriation as an undesirable, the Chinese worker was fixed
imovably on his original mine subject to whatever conditions might prevail there.
This situation was reinforced by the whole system of Government licensing and
penalties laid down by the Importation Ordinance.(120) Thus employees had no fear
that widespread deductions for loafing, maximum on piece rates, as existed at
Randfontein, or poor relations between the Chinese and their overseers, might drive
the work force to seek employment at other mines offering better conditions. What
they had to fear in consequence was a determined combination to resist the more
the socially devisive and unacceptable conditions of all aspects of mining work.
That some of these combinations fell within and some outside of the legal net
laid by the power of organised mining capitalism is explicable by the degree of
cohesion and consciousness of a particular group of Chinese, in response to a
particular level of felt grievance. The North Randfontein dispute showed clearly
the serious possibilities which might result when a combination of Chinese was
conducted outside the scope of this legal net. The Chamber's activities in the
subsequent months must be seen as attempts to rectify affairs so as to prevent the
recurrence of a situation similar to that at North Randfontein which had provoked
that formidable if short-lived display of worker strength.
Summary
Events at the North Randfontein mine between 22nd March and 4th April 1905 w*ere .
crucial in determining the nature of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines' wages
policy in respect of the Chinese. Despite sophisticated response from the
Chinese work force, the greater degree of coercive State power available to
the mine owners, either 1n the form of police power or the Foreign Labour
Department, meant that a potentially dangerous situation could be brought under
control, whatever the legality of the situation. Furthermore, the collusion of
certain state departments with the mine owners answered not only the future
settlement of such industrial disputes, but also the satisfactory implementation
of wage policies on lines which not only favoured the mining interests profitability
requirements but also enabled them to add a greater degree of control over their
work force than had existed before. This obviated the necessity of recourse to
such dangerous expedients as had been tried at the North Randfontein mine.
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